On Sun, 16 Dec 2007 07:00:25 GMT, throopw@sheol.org (Wayne Throop) wrote:

>: John Schilling <schillin@spock.usc.edu>
>: hat we do mean is, how Germany could plausibly have won from
>: *a* situation consistent with the information readily available to an
>: interested civilian in late 1944.
>
>OK. I remember elsethread, though, that an assertion was made that
>those civilians would have been wrong, and the reply that not necessarily,
>that it *could* have worked out differently.
>
>Put it this way. In reality, I expect (not *sure*, but I expect)
>that after D-day, there was nothing Germany could do that would
>assure a military victory, or even a stalemate.

Right. I think, given the facts as they actually were, Germany's
window for victory closed sometime in late 1942. And for a year
before then it was a fairly narrow window leading only to an ugly
stalemate of a victory.


>I just saw an all-WWII-all-the-time channel program which came up
>with the scenario that if the fighter programs underway had been
>accelerated a bit, they could have bought time to develop a long
>range heavy bomber, and a nuclear weapon, and bombed New York.
>All from plans sort-of-being-worked-on. But I'm not sure even
>that would have had a good long-term effect on Germany's chances...

If we spot the Germans a decent atomic bomb factory, and ample
logistical support for their jet fighter operations, we might be
able to contrive a stalemate-type victory in late 1945. In fact,
there was no realistic probability of either - the German nuclear
program was hopelessly off-track and underfunded from the start,
and the German economy didn't shift over to a full wartime footing
until way too late.

But neither of those factors were commonly known in the US/UK at
the time, and stuff like that is the basis for many a "maybe we're
not going to win this one" fear.


And if it's an SFnal fear/prognostication/alternate history, the
bit where it depends on Secret Nazi Superweapons and other tech
stuff is always a plus :-)


>Of course, who knows what they could have pulled out politically...
>but even there... I dunno.

Politics, and logistics, are less glamorous than Secret Nazi
Superweapons, but really just as likely candidates for someone
snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

Hmm, for that you'd probably want to take the USSR out of the
equation. Maybe Russia is on the brink of a 1917-style internal
collapse. Or maybe it's the alliance with the US/UK that is on
the brink, with everyone recognizing what is to come and someone
jumping the gun and going to cold-war mode before WWII is properly
finished.

Again, not in the cards the way things actually stood in 1944, but
perhaps plausible given what little information was available.


And of course we can come up with synergistic combinations of all
the above. Can, could, and did - a few years' of war does tend to
breed extreme pessimism among all concerned.


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In article <hkuhm3dsnoau9dpdd39s4blo62gkavc0o9@4ax.com>,
John Schilling <schillin@spock.usc.edu> wrote:

> Right. I think, given the facts as they actually were, Germany's
> window for victory closed sometime in late 1942. And for a year
> before then it was a fairly narrow window leading only to an ugly
> stalemate of a victory.

From what I read, Hitler et. al. raided the economy of Germany and
subject ****ries to continue he need more economies to loot. A stalemate
then was not an option.

John Schilling wrote:
> On Sun, 16 Dec 2007 07:00:25 GMT, throopw@sheol.org (Wayne Throop)
> wrote:
>
>>> John Schilling <schillin@spock.usc.edu>
>>> hat we do mean is, how Germany could plausibly have won from
>>> *a* situation consistent with the information readily available to
>>> an interested civilian in late 1944.
>>
>> OK. I remember elsethread, though, that an assertion was made that
>> those civilians would have been wrong, and the reply that not
>> necessarily, that it *could* have worked out differently.
>>
>> Put it this way. In reality, I expect (not *sure*, but I expect)
>> that after D-day, there was nothing Germany could do that would
>> assure a military victory, or even a stalemate.
>
> Right. I think, given the facts as they actually were, Germany's
> window for victory closed sometime in late 1942. And for a year
> before then it was a fairly narrow window leading only to an ugly
> stalemate of a victory.
>
>
>> I just saw an all-WWII-all-the-time channel program which came up
>> with the scenario that if the fighter programs underway had been
>> accelerated a bit, they could have bought time to develop a long
>> range heavy bomber, and a nuclear weapon, and bombed New York.
>> All from plans sort-of-being-worked-on. But I'm not sure even
>> that would have had a good long-term effect on Germany's chances...
>
> If we spot the Germans a decent atomic bomb factory, and ample
> logistical support for their jet fighter operations, we might be
> able to contrive a stalemate-type victory in late 1945. In fact,
> there was no realistic probability of either - the German nuclear
> program was hopelessly off-track and underfunded from the start,
> and the German economy didn't shift over to a full wartime footing
> until way too late.

_Which_ German nuclear program? Didn't they have something like a dozen
different ones all competing with each other for resources? (Which I
understand was typical of the way Hitler ran things. He _liked_ having the
people under him competing with each other rather than co-operating.)

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On Wed, 19 Dec 2007 18:33:48 -0800, John Schilling
<schillin@spock.usc.edu> wrote:

>Hmm, for that you'd probably want to take the USSR out of the
>equation. Maybe Russia is on the brink of a 1917-style internal
>collapse. Or maybe it's the alliance with the US/UK that is on
>the brink, with everyone recognizing what is to come and someone
>jumping the gun and going to cold-war mode before WWII is properly
>finished.

According to a BBC series from last year based on the memoirs of
Churchill's Bodyguard, at the Tehran conference, Roosevelt stayed at
Stalin's embassy and had frequent talks with Stalin alone, apart from
Churchill, and Roosevelt was apparently fully convinced that Stalin could
be trusted, during *and* after the war, while he avoided talking to
Churchill apart from the official part of the conference.

Alter Roosevelt's attitude, and you might get a ways towards the scenario
you describe.

Jasper